Servidor MCP do zapCore (WhatsApp): leitura sempre, envio atrás de flag e allowlist de destino.
Inferred from the transports this listing declares (stdio). A client not listed here hasn’t been ruled out — it just isn’t something Forge can confirm.
ZAPCORE_TOKENAPI keyrequiredToken da instância zapCore (header `token` da API v2).
ZAPCORE_CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_IDOAuth appoptionalClient ID do service token do Cloudflare Access, se a base estiver atrás do Access. Anda em par com ZAPCORE_CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRET — os dois ou nenhum.
ZAPCORE_CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRETOAuth appoptionalClient secret do service token do Cloudflare Access. Par de ZAPCORE_CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_ID.
Declared by the author in the official MCP registry. Forge does not store, broker, or ever see these values — the config below is scaffolded with placeholders you fill in locally.
Verification confirms publisher identity (repo ownership), not code safety. The security scan covers known CVEs and suspicious install scripts.
Forge has no scan on record for this entry, so it holds no observation of its tool surface. That is an absence of evidence, not evidence that it exposes no tools.
Servidor MCP do zapCore (WhatsApp): leitura sempre, envio atrás de flag e allowlist de destino.
This package has not been scanned yet, so no dependency tree has been resolved.